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Abstract 
 
High levels of excess reserves have been a persistent feature of Jamaica’s commercial banking 
system within the past two decades. These reserves provide a positive impact in terms of the 
institutions’ ability to respond to liquidity shocks. Notwithstanding this, questions have been 
raised as to whether or not such high levels of excess reserves present challenges to the Central 
Bank in its pursuit of price stability. For example, banks have been able to easily find the 
wherewithal to extend credit, even when the Central Bank adopts an extremely tight monetary 
policy stance. In this context, this paper examines the trends in excess reserves of commercial 
banks in Jamaica during the period 1998 to 2010 and the challenges encountered by the Central 
Bank in the implementation of monetary policy. The paper estimates the demand for excess 
reserves using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds test approach developed by 
Pesaran et al. (2001). The empirical results show that the major determinants of the excess 
reserves of commercial banks in Jamaica in the long-run and short-run are the reserve 
requirements, fluctuations in the currency-to-deposit ratio, the deviation of income from trend, 
the volatility of income, the deficit of the Central Government and the interest rate offered on the 
BOJ’s 180-day security.  
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1.0      Introduction 
 
All deposit-taking institutions in Jamaica are mandated to meet statutory reserve 
requirements. These minimum reserve requirements came into effect in 1964 when the 
required reserve ratio for commercial banks was set at 15.0 per cent. The introduction of 
this requirement was among a set of direct policy tools implemented by the Central Bank 
shortly after its establishment to control money and credit in an attempt to minimize the 
fluctuations in prices, employment and the exchange rate. The law governing the 
institutions therefore stipulates that the entities are required to hold a portion of their 
prescribed liabilities as liquid assets. The prescribed liabilities include deposits, funds 
borrowed from other institutions and the interest accrued and payable on these liabilities. 
In Jamaica, the liquid assets of commercial banks include notes and coins, the cash 
reserves and other deposits at the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), Government of Jamaica (GOJ) 
securities maturing within 270 days, Treasury Bills and any other security designated by 
the Ministry of Finance. This ratio, which is set by the central bank, therefore includes a 
cash component as well as a non-cash component.  
 
In 1984, the Bank of Jamaica Act was amended to allow the Central Bank to vary the 
percentage of prescribed liabilities that commercial banks are required to maintain as 
liquid assets.2 The reserve requirement reached the maximum of 50.0 per cent in July 
1992 shortly after the liberalization of the financial sector which resulted in the removal 
of foreign exchange, trade, credit, capital and interest rate controls.  Subsequently, the 
reserve requirement for commercial banks was significantly reduced in the context of a 
shift in the implementation of monetary policy towards the use of indirect tools. 
Following a sustained period of stability in the ratio, the requirement was increased in 
response to the adverse impact from the global financial crises and was 26.0 per cent as at 
end-December 2010, the cash component of which was 12.0 per cent.  
 
During the 12-year period ended December 2010, reserves in commercial banks have 
averaged $57.9 billion in comparison to the average requirement of $38.7 billion. While 
                                                 
2 This percentage shall not be less than 15.0 per cent or more than 50.0 per cent. Amendments in December 
1991 further allowed the Bank of Jamaica the flexibility to set different rates for different banks. 
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these reserves provide a positive impact in terms of the institutions’ ability to respond to 
liquidity shocks, questions have been raised as to whether or not such high levels of excess 
reserves present challenges in the Central Bank’s pursuit of price stability. For example, 
commercial banks have been able to easily find the wherewithal to extend credit, even 
when the Central Bank adopts an extremely tight monetary policy stance. 
 
Agenor et.al (2008) posited that the level of excess reserves might be of interest to central 
bankers as an abundance of liquidity may hamper the ability of monetary policy to 
influence the level of inflation and economic activity. 3 Ganley (2004) supported this 
view and noted that the rapid accumulation of excess reserves could lead to monetary 
growth outside the central bank’s target range which may be reflected in higher domestic 
consumption and undesirable increases in inflation. Given these views, a number of 
studies have attempted to model the empirical determinants of commercial bank excess 
reserves, however only a few have attempted these models for a developing country.  
This paper is an addition to the empirical studies on developing countries and is the first 
of its kind attempted for Jamaica.  
 
Jamaica provides an interesting case study since a relatively large portion of excess liquid 
assets in Jamaica consist of interest-bearing BOJ and Government securities, items that 
are attractively remunerated. This paper therefore seeks to explore the factors influencing 
the level of excess reserves held by commercial banks, a phenomenon which has not been 
explored for the country.   
 
Section II of the paper will examine challenges which excess reserves pose to monetary 
policy in Jamaica for the period March 1998 to December 2010. Section III will review 
the literature on excess reserves, particularly levels of excess reserves in developing 
countries and its impact on the implementation of monetary policy in these countries. An 
empirical model of the demand for excess reserves in Jamaica is estimated and discussed 
                                                 
3 Excess reserves and excess liquidity are used interchangeably throughout the paper. The term excess 
reserves refers to the measurement of excess liquid assets. 
 4
in Section IV. The final section summarizes the main findings of the paper and presents 
some policy conclusions.  
 
2.0       Review of Literature 
Excess reserves in commercial banks have been of interest to researchers for several 
years. In this regard, several studies have proposed various theories to explain why profit-
maximizing banks hold excess reserves and the factors which influence the demand for 
these reserves. Dow (2001) noted that the standard approach to modeling the demand for 
excess reserves was to view it as part of a bank's liquidity management decision. He 
stated that faced with an uncertain flow of funds, banks held reserves to avoid overdraft 
or reserve deficiency penalties on their accounts at the central bank. Dow stated that his 
model found support for two basic relationships identified in the general model of the 
precautionary demand for reserves developed by Poole (1968). The first relationship 
identified was that the quantity of excess reserves demanded should vary inversely with 
short-term interest rates which, assuming that excess reserves pay no interest, are the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves. The second proposition was the demand for excess 
reserves should increase with uncertainty as these reserves provided a buffer from 
shocks.4  
Agénor, Aizerman and Hoffmaister (2004) assessed the extent to which the fall in credit 
in the East Asian countries during the 1990s was supply or demand-driven by exploring 
the precautionary motive for holding non-remunerated excess liquid assets.5 They 
developed a model that identified the determinants of excess liquid assets of commercial 
banks as the ratio of required reserves to total deposits, the volatility of the cash to 
deposit ratio, the deviation and volatility of output from trend, the discount rate as well as 
lagged values of excess reserves. The reserve to deposits ratio was used to capture the 
impact of reserve requirements while the coefficients of variation of the cash to deposit 
ratio and the deviation of income from trend measured liquidity risk and output volatility 
                                                 
4 This model of excess reserve demand assumed that uncertainty increased proportionately with the level of 
transactions deposits. 
 
5 This is in contrast to Jamaica where excess liquid assets are interest-bearing. 
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related to the banks’ precautionary motives. The deviation of income from trend was used 
as a proxy for changes in the demand for cash. In a cyclical downturn banks were 
expected to anticipate lower transactions-related demand for currency by the public and 
would therefore decrease their holdings of excess reserves. Agénor et.al noted that the 
penalty rate may be proxied by either the discount rate which represented the last resort 
facility for banks or the money market rate which reflected the cost of liquidity in the 
market.  
 
Agénor et.al (op cit) found that the estimation results were in general consistent with the 
a priori expectations. These results showed that the required reserve to deposit ratio had a 
negative impact on excess reserves. The volatility of the cash to deposit ratio as well as 
the effect of an increase in the penalty rate was found to have a positive effect on excess 
reserves. The deviation of output from trend was found to be positively related to excess 
reserves; however the volatility of the income from trend was incorrectly signed and did 
not significantly influence excess reserves.  
 
In the context of the Caribbean, Maynard and Moore (2005) estimated the demand for 
excess liquid assets in Barbados between 1974 and 2004. They noted that the main 
factors which explained a bank’s demand for reserves could be linked to its customer 
characteristics, the macroeconomic environment as well as the monetary policies and 
fiscal strategies. Maynard and Moore extended the model developed by Agénor et.al 
(2004) and accounted for the impact of fiscal strategies on the demand for excess liquid 
assets by including the net domestic assets of the banking system. They noted that a bank 
needed to hold liquid assets to meet the cash requirements of its customers which could 
be captured by fluctuations in the cash-to-deposit ratio. In the absence of resources to 
satisfy customers’ demand, financial institutions borrowed funds from the inter-bank 
market or from the central bank which incur an interest penalty. Maynard and Moore 
noted that the actions of the monetary authorities influenced the demand for liquid assets 
primarily through changes in the statutory requirement and employed the use of the 
required reserve ratio, the discount rate and the treasury-bill rate to capture the impact of 
monetary policy in the paper. An increase in required reserves, ceteris paribus, was 
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expected to reduce the demand for liquid assets, since the revenue foregone from holding 
these low or zero interest-bearing assets was expected to increase. The interest rate 
variables were expected to have similar but opposite effects on the demand for excess 
liquid assets. An increase in the penalty rate, for example, was expected to increase the 
costs of a liquidity shortfall and should therefore increase the demand for excess reserves, 
while an increase in the Treasury bill rate increases the opportunity cost of holding 
liquidity assets and should result in lower holdings of excess reserves by commercial 
banks. 6 
 
The current macroeconomic situation was expected to influence the level of excess 
reserves held by commercial banks, both in terms of the level of economic activity (given 
by the deviation of income from trend) and income volatility. Maynard and Moore 
explained that a cyclical downturn, for example, was expected to lower banks’ expected 
transactions demand for money and therefore lead to decreased holdings of excess liquid 
assets.  In contrast, a rise in economic volatility, since it is usually accompanied by 
liquidity shocks, could lead to greater holdings of excess reserves. 
 
The fiscal policy stance of government was cited as having a significant influence on the 
liquidity of commercial banks.  Maynard and Moore noted that increased government 
spending could be attained by issuing debt, increasing taxes or creating money which 
could be represented by a change in the net domestic assets of the banking system. 
Increased government spending, when financed through money creation or overseas 
borrowing was expected to result in greater deposits in the banking system and by 
extension an increase in bank reserves.    
 
In terms of the empirical results, Maynard and Moore found that all the coefficients were 
generally in line with a priori expectations. The required reserve variable and the 
volatility of the cash to deposit ratios were found to be negatively related to the holdings 
of excess cash reserves.  However, the coefficient of the required reserve variable was 
insignificant suggesting that a change in the required reserve ratio did not significantly 
                                                 
6 This would not apply to Jamaica since Treasury bills are a component of liquid assets. An increase in the 
Treasury bill rate would ceteris paribus, encourage banks to hold more of these liquid assets. 
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influence the demand for excess reserves. The estimates also indicated that excess 
reserves tended to be inversely related to the deviation of income from trend. The 
volatility of income was incorrectly signed and had a relatively minor effect on the 
holdings of excess reserves. An increase in interest rates, which represented the 
opportunity cost of holding excess reserves, was negatively and significantly related to 
the holdings of excess liquid assets, while higher government spending was found to 
increase excess reserves.  
 
Saxegaard (2006) examined the pattern of excess liquidity in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
and its consequences for the effectiveness of monetary policy.7 He estimated the demand 
for excess reserves by extending the methodology proposed by Agenor, Aizenman and 
Hoffmaister (2004) to include variables that accounted for the involuntary build-up of 
excess reserves.8 In terms of the estimation of the precautionary demand for excess 
reserves, he employed the use of variables similar to those used by Agenor as well as the 
volatility of deposits, both private sector deposits and government deposits, and the ratio 
of demand deposits to time and savings deposits.9 All three variables were expected to be 
positively related to the demand for excess reserves. In terms of the measures of the 
volatility of deposits, Saxegaard explained that banks were expected to hold a higher 
level of reserves to protect themselves against unexpected withdrawals if the deposit base 
was relatively volatile. The ratio of demand deposits to time and savings deposits was 
included to capture the effect of a high proportion of short-term deposits on the volatility 
of the banks’ liabilities.  
 
                                                 
7 Sub-Saharan Africa includes Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Nigeria, 
and Uganda. 
 
8 The term involuntary is used by Saxegaard to describe non-remunerated reserves that do not provide a 
return. 
 
9 Variables similar to those used by Agenor included the output gap, the discount rate, the reserve 
requirement, as well as measures of volatility for the cash-to-deposit ratio and the output gap.  The ratio of 
demand deposits to savings and time deposits was included to capture the effect of short-term deposits on 
the volatility of commercial banks’ liabilities 
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Saxegaard found that for the Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CEMAC), the results suggested that holdings of precautionary reserves may be 
explained by the volatility of private sector and government deposits.10 An increase in the 
volatility of private sector deposits was found to increase commercial banks’ holdings of 
excess liquidity while the increased volatility of government deposits reduced the 
holdings of excess liquidity. Additionally, a change in the reserve requirement did not 
have any significant effect on excess reserves.  
 
The results for Nigeria indicated that all the findings were in line with a priori 
expectations and that the demand for excess reserves for precautionary purposes was 
mainly due to changes in the required reserve ratio, the ratio of demand to savings 
deposits and the volatility of the cash to deposit ratio. For Uganda, the results suggest that 
the demand for precautionary reserves was primarily influenced by the volatility of 
government deposits. There was also a significant effect from the maturity structure of 
commercial banks’ liabilities as was the case in Nigeria. The volatility in the output gap 
was important although wrongly signed, relative to a priori expectations.  
 
Saxegaard noted that the distinction between the concepts of involuntary excess liquidity 
and precautionary excess liquidity had important monetary policy implications. He 
explained that if a bank held significant excess liquidity for precautionary purposes, then 
sterilization was unnecessary, since this liquidity was less likely to be inflationary. 
Saxegaard argued that it was important to recognize that precautionary excess reserves 
represented a structural problem which entailed an inefficient allocation of resources, 
although it might not pose an immediate danger to inflation. If banks held significant 
amounts of involuntary excess liquidity, however, the danger existed that once demand 
conditions improved; lending would rapidly expand, increasing the risk of inflation. 
Hence, to the extent that involuntary excess liquidity existed, this liquidity should be 
removed from the system.  
 
                                                 
10 Only the results for the precautionary motive of holding excess reserves will be discussed as this is in 
line with the purpose of this paper given that excess liquid assets in Jamaica earn a return and are not 
involuntarily held.  
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Ganley (2004) focused on the implications of surplus liquidity for monetary policy. He 
noted that the importance of surplus liquidity for central banks lay in its ability to 
influence the transmission mechanism of monetary policy; the conduct of central bank 
intervention in the money market, and the central bank’s balance sheet and income. 
Ganley highlighted the impact of the surplus liquidity on the transmission mechanism, 
particularly the interest rate channel. He noted that with surplus liquidity, the 
transmission mechanism may break down or become weakened at an early stage as rates 
may not adjust accordingly and as such the central bank’s ability to transmit its preferred 
interest rate into the market is weakened. Surplus liquidity may also have implications for 
the exchange rate as excess balances may also find their way into the foreign exchange 
market if the public prefers to hold some of its liquidity in foreign currency. This would 
exert downward pressure on the domestic currency and could have inflationary effects.  
 
3.0 Excess Reserves in the Commercial Banks and Challenges which these 
present for Monetary Policy: The Jamaican Experience 
 
Figure 1: The Trend in Excess Reserves  
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During the period March 1998 to December 2010, excess reserves in the commercial 
banks operating in Jamaica increased to $35.1 billion from $3.5 billion. On average, these 
reserves were 14.7 percentage points above the statutory requirement and were 
approximately 15.0 per cent at end-December 2010 (see Figure 1). The banks’ decision to 
increase or lower these reserves during different periods appeared to have been 
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conditioned upon the prevailing macroeconomic condition, investor sentiment as well as 
the outlook for the main macroeconomic indicators. In this context, changes in the banks’ 
liquidity preference would oftentimes create challenges for the Central Bank in its pursuit 
of price and financial system stability. For example, in response to periods characterized 
by an increased demand for credit, banks have been able to easily find the resources to 
meet this demand, despite a tightening of monetary policy by the Central Bank. 
Conversely, credit growth has been weak in periods when the central bank loosens 
policy. The non-responsiveness of credit during these period increases the discussion on 
the fact that  although there has been a the trend reduction in both the reserve requirement 
and policy rates, interest rate spreads in commercial banks have remained high. The high 
spreads reflect lending rates which have been sticky. With regard to the foreign exchange 
market, excess reserves have provided the banks with the wherewithal to create demand 
pressure and consequently instability in the market during periods of uncertainty and 
reduced confidence. 
 
Excess Reserves, Private Sector Credit & Loan Rates 
The data suggests that private sector credit often times does not respond to changes in the 
signal rate or the reserve requirements given banks capacity to extend credit from 
holdings of excess reserves. For example, during 2002, the Bank pursued an 
expansionary policy stance. Concurrently, annual growth in loans and advances 
accelerated to 34.6 per cent in February 2003 from 17.1 per cent in February 2002 (see 
Figure 2). Subsequently, although monetary policy was significantly tightened, growth in 
credit accelerated to 49.9 per cent in October 2003 and grew further to 45.9 per cent in 
January 2004. Another clear example, is the 2006 period when the bank tightened policy 
but growth in credit accelerated. Given the onset of the global financial crisis and the 
resultant tightening of monetary policy, credit growth decelerated sharply. However, this 
was due to a fall in demand for loans as banks still had the wherewithal to extend credit.  
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Figure 2: The CRR, BOJ 180-day & 365-day rates and Annual Growth in Private 
Sector Credit 11  
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Following work done by Khemraj (2007), a liquidity preference curve for Jamaica for the 
period 1997:1 to 2010:4 was constructed using the Loess procedure.12  Khemaj showed 
that the liquidity preference curve was horizontal at approximately 17.0 per cent which 
suggested that a commercial bank would not, on average, lend to the marginal borrower 
at a rate below 17.0 per cent. The results obtained using data up to 2010 were close to 
those of Khemraj. The liquidity preference curve was horizontal at approximately 16.5 
per cent which indicates that loans and excess reserves were perfect substitutes and as 
such a commercial bank would not, on average, lend to the marginal borrower, if that 
borrower could not pay at least 16.5 per cent. 13 In addition, at rates below 16.5 per cent 
commercial banks would rather hold excess reserves than extend loans. This minimum 
                                                 
11 As at May 2009, the Bank removed the 365-day tenor from its menu of securities. 
   
12 In the Loess method, weighted least squares is used to fit linear or quadratic functions of the predictors at 
the centers of neighborhoods. The radius of each neighborhood is chosen so that it contains a specified 
percentage of the data points. The fraction of the data, called the smoothing parameter, in each local 
neighborhood controls the smoothness of the estimated surface.  
 
13 In Khemaj (2007), the curve became horizontal at a loan rate of approximately 17.0 per cent for the 
period 1990:1 to 2006:4. Khemraj argued that this was possible because as oligopolies, banks were able to 
mark-up the loan rate over an exogenous interest rate, transaction costs, and also account for the risk of 
default associated with a specific class of borrowers. 
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rate is expected to continue to decline with an improvement in macroeconomic conditions 
and operating efficiency in the banks.   
 
Figure 3: Liquidity preference curve for Jamaica (Loess fit) 
  
 
Figure 4: The Liquid Assets Ratio 
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Commercial banks’ interest rate spread has declined marginally despite a trend reduction 
in the reserve requirement; particularly the non-interest bearing cash reserve requirement 
as well as sharp downward adjustments to policy rates (see Figure 4).  Figure 5 shows 
that the interest spread in Jamaica declined to 13.59 pps in November 2010 from 15.05 
pps in March 1998 and averaged approximately 12.70 pps during the period. The 
maintenance of these high spreads has been largely been facilitated by the ability of the 
banks to charge high loan rates in an oligopolistic market structure.  
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Figure 5: The Interest Rate Spread (March 1998 to November 2010) 
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Economic Growth 
Figure 6: Quarterly Growth in GDP, 12-month Point-to-point Inflation and the 
Liquid asset Requirement 
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In a context where adjustments to the Bank’s monetary policy stance did not always 
create the desired changes in private sector credit, an interesting line of investigation 
which was undertaken was the pattern of economic growth which evolved during the 
review period.  The data show that the country experienced economic growth for most of 
the review period, albeit marginal (see Figure 6). The increased economic activity was 
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underpinned by a stable macroeconomic environment, for some of the sample years. For 
example, the country experienced its fifth consecutive year of single digit inflation in 
2001. These positive developments facilitated an easing of monetary policy stance 
conveyed through successive reductions in the liquid asset and cash reserve requirements 
of deposit-taking institutions. Consequent on these reductions, the liquid asset and cash 
reserve ratios declined to 23.0 per cent and 9.0 per cent, respectively, by September 
2002.14 Private sector credit expanded during the period; however, there was a notable 
increase in the banks’ excess reserves given the need to sterilize the liquidity which 
emanated from the buildup in the NIR consequent on the financing of the fiscal deficit 
through foreign resources.  
 
Figure 7: Excess Reserves and the Fiscal Deficit  
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Excess Reserves and Open Market Operations 
The fiscal deficit which was partly financed from external sources, contributed to a build-
up in the NIR and consequently Jamaica Dollar liquidity in the financial system. The BOJ   
                                                 
14The liquid asset and cash reserve ratios remained at this level until December 2008 when against the 
background of elevated inflation; an increase of 2.0 percentage points in each ratio was effected. There 
were further increases in subsequent months of 2.0 percentage points and 1.0 percentage point, 
respectively, in each ratio. 
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has used open market operations to influence the level of liquidity and the entire structure 
of interest rates in the Jamaican financial system. This has resulted in an increase in the 
stock of open market securities on the balance sheet of the Central Bank. These liabilities 
increased to $129.2 billion at end-December 2010 from $32.3 billion in March 1998 (see 
Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Stock of Open Market Securities and Excess Reserves  
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The use of open market operations to remove excess liquidity from the financial system is 
not without cost. Annual OMO costs increased to $22.6 billion in December 2010 from 
$9.3 billion in December 2001 (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9: Annual Stock of Open market Securities and its Interest Costs  
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Excess Reserves and the Foreign Exchange Market  
Another challenge for the Central Bank is the maintenance of an “orderly” foreign 
exchange market in periods of uncertainty given the high levels of excess reserves in the 
banks which may be liquidated to buy foreign exchange on their account.  
 
Figure 10: Excess Reserves and the Quarterly Change in the Exchange Rate  
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The impact of excess reserves on the foreign exchange market would be evidenced in the 
volatility of the exchange rate coinciding with sharp changes in the excess reserves. 
Figure 10 shows the quarterly change in the exchange rate and the excess liquid assets of 
commercial banks during the review period. There are a number of periods in which a 
sharp depreciation in the exchange rate coincided with a sharp fall in the excess reserves. 
Most noticeable, in the March 2003 and June 2003 quarters, the exchange rate 
depreciated by 10.1 per cent and 4.9 per cent, respectively. There was also a reduction in 
the excess liquid assets which coincided with the depreciation of the exchange rate in 
these two quarters. The depreciation in the exchange rate during these two quarters was 
largely due to a fall in market confidence triggered by deterioration in the balance of 
payments and fiscal accounts and the related downgrade of the outlook on Jamaica’s 
sovereign debt by Standard and Poor’s( see Figure 8). In response to these developments, 
the Bank tightened monetary policy by increasing interest rates and augmenting the 
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supply of foreign exchange to the market.15 A similar relationship was observed in 2006, 
2007 and 2008. 
 
The Central Bank was severely challenged to maintain stability in the foreign exchange 
market during the period 2007 – 2009, in light of the impact of adverse external 
developments on the domestic economy.  More specifically, the December 2008 and 
March 2009 quarters were characterized by sharp depreciations of 10.7 per cent and 10.4 
per cent, respectively, in the exchange rate.  Concurrently, there were reductions in the 
excess liquid assets in commercial banks in these quarters. These declines occurred in 
tandem with increases in the demand for foreign currency in response to a fall out in 
foreign exchange inflows, increased margin calls on GOJ global bonds, the need to meet 
repo payments to overseas institutions as well as a reduction in trade credit lines. Market 
confidence was also negatively affected by unfavourable reports by various rating 
agencies. In response, to a heightened pace of depreciation in the value of the Jamaica 
Dollar, particularly in the first quarter of 2009, some banks reduced their excess reserves, 
in particular their holdings of BOJ securities to finance an increase in the holdings of 
GOJ foreign securities as a hedge. The Bank responded by instituting a raft of measures 
which included tightening monetary policy at various points over the three-year period, 
moral suasion and augmenting the supply of foreign currency to the market. These 
measures led to a restoration of stability in a context where increases in the rates offered 
on the BOJ’s instruments as well as the offer of attractively priced variable rate 
instruments by the Bank restored the demand for Jamaica Dollar financial assets. The 
demand for the assets would have caused a build-up in excess reserves.   
 
Excess reserves remained high during 2010 despite an easing of the Bank’s policy stance, 
without being a threat to stability in the foreign exchange market. Of significance, was an 
appreciation of approximately 4.0 per cent in the June quarter, the largest quarterly 
appreciation since the June 1996 quarter.  This coexistence of high levels of reserves with 
sharp appreciations in the exchange rate could be considered a paradigm shift in the 
Jamaican economy. The shift occurred in the context of improved prospects for inflation, 
                                                 
15 See Bank of Jamaica Quarterly Monetary Policy Reports January – March 2003 and April – June 2003. 
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weak domestic demand conditions, expectations for a lowering of the fiscal deficit and 
the Government’s debt to GDP ratio as well as for a build-up in the NIR. The outlook and 
expectations emanated from the implementation of the Jamaica Debt Exchange (JDX) 
programme and the signing of a 27-month Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF.  
 
Given the challenges posed by excess reserves in the implementation of monetary policy, 
it is important to understand the factors which influence the level of these reserves held 
by commercial banks. As such, the demand for excess reserves will be estimated. 
 
4.0      Data and Econometric Methodology 
4.1      Data 
The data used in the estimation of the ARDL model was of quarterly frequency and 
covered the period 1998:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
excess reserves in commercial banks as a fraction of prescribed liabilities. The regressors 
used were lagged values of the dependent variable; current and lagged values of (the log 
of) required liquid assets as a proportion of prescribed liabilities, current and lagged 
values of the coefficient of variation of the currency-to-deposit ratio, current and lagged 
values of the quarterly deficit of the Central Government, current and lagged values of 
the Bank’s 180-day rate, current and lagged values of the deviation of output from trend 
and the coefficient of variation of the deviation of income from trend. Output was 
seasonally adjusted using the Census x12 method and the trend component of income 
was generated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The coefficient of variation for the ratio 
of income to trend and the log of currency to deposit ratio were calculated based on the 
average of the standard deviation of the specified for 3 prior periods and the current 
variable divided by the average of 3 leads and the current period. 
 
4.2        Model Techniques 
Following Agénor, Aizerman and Hoffmaister (2004), an autoregressive distributive lag 
model (ARDL) was used to estimate the demand for excess reserves by commercial 
banks. However, to empirically analyze the long-run relationships and dynamic 
interactions among the variables of interest, this paper employed the bounds testing (or 
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autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration procedure, developed by Pesaran et 
al (1995, 1999). This procedure was adopted for several reasons. The bounds testing 
procedure does not require the pre-testing of the variables included in the model since it 
is applicable irrespective of whether the regressors in the model are purely I(0), purely 
I(1) or mutually cointegrated. However, the procedure is not applicable in the presence of 
I(2) variables and therefore unit root testing is still relevant in its implementation. A 
further advantage is that while other cointegration techniques requires all of the 
regressors to be integrated of the same order, the autoregressive distributed lag approach 
overcomes some of these problems by providing an application on mixed regressors 
which captures both short run and long-run dynamics when testing for the existence of 
cointegration. The ARDL also avoids concerns on a large number of choices, such as the 
number of endogenous and exogenous variables (if any) to be included, the treatment of 
deterministic elements, as well as the order of the VAR. It is also possible that each 
regressor may have a different number of optimal lags. When compared to other 
multivariate cointegration techniques, the bounds testing procedure is easily employed 
since ordinary least squares (OLS) may be used to estimate the cointegration relationship.  
In addition, this procedure is a statistically significant approach for determining 
cointegrating relationships in small samples and as such is deemed to be robust in small 
samples such as that employed in this study.  
 
The ARDL framework as specified in the equation below is used to identify the 
determinants of excess reserves in Jamaica: 
lexrt = α0 +Σα1iΔlexrt-i + Σα2iΔlrrt-i + Σα3i Δ lcvcdt-i + Σα4iΔlcvytt-i + Σα5iΔlgdpgapt-i + 
Σα6iΔldeft-i + α7ipratet-i + 1 lexrt-1 + 4 lrrt-1 + 3 lcvcdt-1 + 4 lcvytt-1 + 5 prate t-1 + 
6 lgdpgapt-1 + 7 ldeft-1 + εt……………   Equation (1) 
The above specification captures the main features of the model employed in this paper. 
A priori, the demand for excess reserves (lexr) is expected to be negatively influenced by 
the reserve requirement (lrr). The interest rate which is represented by the BOJ 180-day 
rate, (prate) is expected to positively influence the demand for excess liquid assets. Given 
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that BOJ securities are a component of liquid assets, banks are expected to increase their 
demand for these assets when the rate of return on these securities increases. In contrast, 
the volatility of the currency to deposit ratio (cvcd) is expected to negatively influence the 
level of excess liquid assets since banks reduce their excess liquid assets to facilitate 
higher holdings of currency in periods of increased demand, such as public holidays. The 
current macroeconomic condition is evidenced in changes in the demand for cash which 
is proxied by lgdpgap. With regard to the current macroeconomic conditions, a cyclical 
downturn, for instance, would lead banks to anticipate lower transaction demand for 
currency by the public. Concurrently, credit demand is expected to be weak. Given this, 
the institutions are likely to reallocate resources to foreign assets or securities if these 
investments are expected to provide attractive rates of return. In this context, there could 
either be a reduction or an increase in the holdings of excess Jamaica Dollar reserves. The 
volatility of income (cvyt) is expected to positively influence the demand for excess 
reserves.  
 
Similar to Maynard and Moore (2004), this paper incorporates changes in fiscal policy 
which may also significantly influence the liquidity of commercial banks. In this regard, 
the deficit of the Central Government was included to capture its effect on the excess 
liquid assets of commercial banks. An increase in the deficit implies ceteris paribus, that 
Government spending has increased which results in greater deposits in the banking 
system and by extension an expansion in the bank reserves. Consequently, an increase in 
the deficit of the Central Government (ldef) would lead to an increase in the excess 
reserves of commercial banks.  
 
The portion of the equation which contains the summation signs and t1  to t7  
represents the short-run dynamics of the model that determine the holdings of excess 
reserves. The long-run parameters computed as (λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6, λ7)/ λ1 represent the 
adjustment of each variable towards the long-run relationship. The error term, εt is the 
classical disturbance term with the usual assumptions of a zero mean an independent 
distribution. The ARDL approach to cointegration seeks to determine whether a long run 
relationship exists among the variables by using the bounds test. The bound test is an F-
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test of joint significance of the variables which specifies a null hypothesis of no 
cointegration against the alternative of the existence of a long run relationship. The null 
hypothesis of no cointegration defined by:  
 
H0 : λ1=λ2 =λ3 =λ4 = λ5 =λ6 =λ7=0, is tested against the alternative of   
H1 : λ1 ≠ λ2 ≠ λ3 ≠ λ4 ≠  λ5 ≠ λ6≠ λ7.  
 
However, the asymptotic distribution of this F-statistic is non-standard irrespective of 
whether the variables are I(0) or I(1). Pesaran et al. (2001) tabulated two sets of 
appropriate critical values for a given level of significance. One set assumes all variables 
are I(1) while the other assumes that they are all I(0). This band covers all possible 
classifications of the variables into I(1) and I(0) or even fractional integration. If the 
computed F-statistic exceeds the upper critical bounds value, then the null of no 
cointegration may be rejected. A test statistic which is below the lower critical bounds 
value implies that there is no cointegrating relationship however, if the test statistic falls 
within the bounds, then the test is inconclusive. 
 
To ascertain the goodness of fit of the ARDL model, diagnostic and stability tests are 
conducted. The diagnostic test examines the serial correlation, functional form, 
normality, and heteroscedasticity associated with the model. The structural stability test 
of the model is also tested using the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) based on 
the recursive residuals. Parameter stability is indicated when the plots of the CUSUMSQ 
move within the 5.0 per cent critical lines. 
 
4.3       Empirical Results 
Before testing the cointegration relationship, a test of the order of integration for each 
variable using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) was conducted.16 Although the 
ARDL framework does not require the pre-testing of variables, the unit root test could 
help in determining whether or not the ARDL model should be used as none of the 
                                                 
16  The ADF tests in Eviews were used to derive the results in the first column of Table 1. 
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variables used should be integrated of order two. Visual inspection of the time series was 
therefore conducted to determine whether there were outliers, seasonality and or 
structural breaks present. These exogenous variables were then incorporated into the 
ADF test of the time series. Initially, the lag length was set to four and a constant, trend, 
seasonal dummies or dummies representing structural breaks identified were included. 
Insignificant lags were deleted until all remaining lags were significant. The histogram 
normality residuals test was then applied and the equation for each variable was accepted 
only if the residuals were normal. A p-value greater than the level of significance, 0.05, 
indicated the null hypothesis of normality of residuals could not be rejected. The t-
statistic of the first lag of each variable was compared to the ADF test statistic to 
determine whether the variable was stationary given the inclusion of constant, trend, 
seasonality or structural breaks. 17 
 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests 
Variables Test statistic Lags Test statistic Lags P -value Test statistic Lags
LEXR -4.365* 0 -2.460 0 0.539 -9.558* 0
LRR -3.076* 0 -6.678* 0
LCVYT -4.681* 1 -4.681* 1 0.408 -6.733* 0
LCVCD -3.465* 0 10.121* 0
LDEF -2.064 3 -7.811* 1
LGDPGAP -3.527* 1 -3.375 1 0.733 -3.675* 0
PRATE -2.680 0 -5.193* 0 0.063 -7.567* 0
5% level of significance -2.921 -3.502 -1.948
DIFFERENCES
First difference
AUGMENTED DICKEY FULLER TESTS
Trend/ intercept /dummy 4Intercept 3
LEVELS
 
1 * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% level of significance. 
2 Since differencing eliminates trend, unit root tests for the first differences are carried out with and without intercept.      
The results show that all first differenced variables are stationary without the intercept. 
3  These results were obtained using the ADF tests in EViews. These values include an intercept only. 
4  Results of ADF tests which include a constant, trend and or dummy variables.  
5 The p-value refers to the histogram normality test of residuals. 
                                                 
17 These results are presented in the second column of Table 1. 
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The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests in Table 1 show that variables 
such as the volatility of income (cvyt) and the 180-day BOJ rate (prate) were stationary in 
level form or I(0). The other variables, the coefficient of variation of the cash to deposit 
ratio (cvcd), the reserve to prescribed liabilities ratio lrr, the deviation of income from 
trend (lgdpgap), the deficit of the Central Government (ldef) and the ratio of excess 
reserves to prescribed liabilities of commercial banks (lexr) were found to be I(1).  Given 
the mixture of I(0) and I(1) variables, ARDL modeling is appropriate.  
 
In implementing the ARDL procedure, it is important to determine the order of lags on 
the first–differenced variables. Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) recommend the use of 4 lags 
with quarterly data. The model was estimated with four lags and the general-to-specific 
approach (Hendry, 1995) utilized to reduce the model to a parsimonious representation. 
Several diagnostic tests including the tests for normality, serial correlation, model 
misspecification and heteroscedasticity were conducted to ascertain the appropriateness 
of the model. In addition, following the estimation of the model, the CUSUMSQ test was 
conducted to assess the parameter constancy. The results indicate the absence of any 
instability of the coefficients because the plot of the CUSUMSQ was confined within the 
5 per cent critical bounds of parameter stability (see Appendix). 
 
Table 2: Calculated F-statistic for the existence of a long-run relationship for excess 
reserves  
Order of lag                  F-statistic  
       4                             F (6, 32) = 14.830* 
 
The relevant critical bounds are obtained in Table CI(iii) (with an unrestricted intercept and no trend; 7 
regressors) in Pesaran et al. (2001). The lower bound is 2.32 while the upper bound is 3.50 at the 5% level 
of significance. Narayan (2005) argues that exiting critical values were based on large sample sizes and 
could not be used for small sample sizes. He therefore, recalculated the critical bounds for smaller samples 
of 30 to 80 observations. These critical values for the bounds test, Case III: unrestricted intercept and no 
trend indicate that for a sample of 50 observations, the lower bound is 2.593 while the upper bound is 
3.941. 
 
The results of the bounds test indicate the calculated F-statistic (F-statistic = 14.830) is 
greater than the upper bound critical value at 5% level of significance (3.941), using an 
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unrestricted intercept and no trend as reported by Narayan (2005) (see Table 2). This 
implies that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at 5% and that there is a 
cointegrating relationship among the variables presented in Equation (1). 
 
Table 3: The Estimated ARDL Model of the Demand for Excess Reserves 
DLEXR = 0.400*DLEXR(-1) + 0.490*DLEXR(-2) +  2.019*DLNRR(-3)  -   0.649*DLCVCD(-1)  
               (3.323)                       (4.386)                      (2.985)                       (-3.358) 
 
-0.424*DLCVCD(-2) - 0.386* DLCVCD(-3) + 34.658*DLDEF - 25.374*DLDEF + 2.098*DPRATE 
(-2.962)                       (-3.095)                       (5.243)                 (-6.123)              (2.140) 
 
-2.051*DPRATE - 1.058*LEXR(-1)  -  1.180*LRR  -  11.846*LGDPGAP(-1) +  0.319*LCVYT  
(-2.262)                 (-8.388)                  (-4.273)            (-3.316)                          (4.580) 
 
+0.834*LCVCD(-1)  -  2.040*LDEF(-1)  
 (4.483)                       (-2.771)              
                                                                          
                                                     Diagnostics 
R2 = 0.791       Norm = 0.080       DW = 1.650       RR = 0.899         HET=0.494         SC =0.080 
 
Notes: T-statistics are shown in the parentheses. R2   is the fraction of the variance of the dependent variable 
that is explained by the model. DW is the Durbin Watson statistic; Norm is the test of normality of the 
residuals based on the Jacque-Bera test statistic; RR is the Ramsey test for functional form mis-
specification (square terms only); HET is the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey heteroscedasticity test based on the 
regression of the squared residuals; SC is Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test of the 4th order 
given that quarterly data is used. 
 
The results of the ARDL model, reported in Table 3 show that the model has passed all 
the relevant diagnostic tests. In this regard, the model may be deemed adequate, 
explaining 79.1 per cent of the demand for excess reserves in Jamaica during the period. 
The coefficient on the lagged excess reserves term is negative, highly significant and in 
line with a priori expectations. It represents the speed at which the variable moves toward 
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restoring the long run equilibrium. The results showed that excess reserves (lexr) have an 
adjustment of -1.058 which indicates that 105 per cent of the adjustment is achieved in 
the first quarter.18 This result suggests that the adjustment process occurs very quickly 
and that there is some overshooting before excess reserves returns to its long run level. 
The negative sign implies that the lagged excess reserves holdings induce smaller 
holdings in the current period. 
 
The long-run cointegrating equation from the ARDL model may be written as: 
 
lexr = 11.194 lgdpgap(-1) - 0.789 lcvcd(-1) + 1.114 lrr(-1) + 1.928 ldef(-1) − 0.301 
lcvyt(-1)  
 
With the exception of the required reserve ratio (lrrd) and the volatility of income (lcvyt) 
which were incorrectly signed, the long run coefficients generally conformed to the a 
priori expectations and were found to be statistically significant. The required reserve 
ratio was found to have a positive impact on excess liquid assets in both in the long-run 
and the short-run. This result could be explained by the fact that in the last two decades, 
commercial banks have consistently held liquid assets in excess of the requirement. In 
this regard, the positive relationship could suggest that commercial banks target some 
level of excess reserves which increases when the required reserve ratio increases. As 
such, the required reserve is not a binding constraint.  
 
The volatility of the currency to deposit ratio was found to negatively impact the level of 
excess liquid assets as expected given that banks reduce their excess liquid assets to 
facilitate higher holdings of currency in periods of increased demand, such as public 
holidays. This result is also similar to that obtained by Maynard and Moore (2005).  
 
The deviation of income from trend and the deficit of the Central Government were 
found to be positively related to the holdings of excess reserves. The positive relationship 
                                                 
18B. BhaskaraRao (2005) noted that the error correction coefficient should be negative but its absolute 
value need not be always be less than unity, implying that, at times, overshooting is a possibility. 
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between the deficit of the Central Government and the holdings of excess reserves 
implies that an increase in Government spending, whether through money creation or 
borrowing from overseas, results in greater deposits in the banking system and by 
extension an increase bank reserves. In terms of the deviation of income from trend 
income, a positive relationship suggests that lower holdings of excess reserves are held in 
a cyclical downturn as consumers reduce their transaction demand for money. The 
current macroeconomic circumstances was found to have the largest impact on the banks 
holdings of excess reserves as a 1.0 per cent increase in income from trend is expected to 
increase the holdings of excess reserves by approximately 11.0 per cent. 
 
The BOJ 180-day rate was found to be a determinant of the banks’ holdings of excess 
reserves but only in the short-run. The cumulative positive impact of the Bank’s rate in 
the short-run is in line with a priori expectations as commercial banks are expected to 
increase their holdings of liquid BOJ securities as the rate of return on these assets 
increase. However, the absence of this rate from the long-run equation suggests that over 
time the commercial banks’ stock of liquid assets is not dependent of the BOJ’s 180-day 
rate.   
 
In contrast to the non-inclusion of the volatility of income in the short-run demand for 
excess reserves, in the long-run the volatility of income was found to have a significant 
but small negative impact on excess reserves similar to the long-run findings of Maynard 
and Moore (2005). They posited that the small, negatively signed coefficient implied that 
the variable had a minor effect on excess reserves probably reflective of the low level of 
volatility in income in Barbados. The same argument could be posited for volatility of 
income in Jamaica as quarterly growth in GDP during the period March 1998 to 
December 2010 was in the range of -1.9 per cent to 4.3 per cent, with average growth of 
0.7 per cent and standard deviation of 2.0 per cent.  
 
In terms of the short-run changes of the other variables, lagged values of excess reserves 
were found to have a positive impact on the demand for excess reserves in Jamaica. This 
implies that increased holdings of excess reserves in prior periods would positively 
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impact holdings in the current period. The required reserve ratio was also found to have a 
significant positive impact on excess reserves in the short-run as a 1.0 per cent increase in 
the ratio was expected to increase excess reserve holdings by approximately 2.02 per cent 
by the third quarter. This is reduced over time to approximately 1.1 per cent as suggested 
by the long-run results. The short-run results suggest that the deficit of the Central 
Government had a cumulative positive impact in the short-run. In this regard, a 1.0 per 
cent increase in the deficit was expected to increase the banks’ holdings of excess 
reserves by approximately 9.3 per cent. This result is greater than the long-run result 
which suggests that excess liquid assets would increase by 1.93 per cent.  
 
 
5.0       Conclusion 
This paper  examined the trend in  excess reserves held by commercial banks in Jamaica, 
presented some challenges faced by the Central Bank in the implementation of monetary 
policy in a context of persistent excess reserves and estimated the demand for excess 
reserves. The analysis highlighted that the maintenance of relatively high excess reserves 
would have facilitated instability in the foreign exchange market as well as credit 
expansion by commercial banks even when the Bank of Jamaica adopted a tight 
monetary policy stance.  
 
Against this background, the paper estimated the demand for excess reserves by 
commercial banks in Jamaica using the framework presented by Agenor et. al (2004). 
Similar to Maynard and Moore (2005), the impact of fiscal strategies on the demand for 
excess reserves was included in the model. The results of the ARDL cointegration model 
revealed that the demand for these reserves was influenced by the deficit of the Central 
Government, the volatility of the currency to deposit ratio as well as the deviation of 
output from trend in the long run. The volatility of income and the required reserve ratio 
although included in the long-run model were incorrectly signed. It was argued that 
commercial banks target some level of excess reserves which is usually above that 
required by the monetary authorities and as such the required reserve was not considered 
a binding constraint. It was proposed that the low variability in Jamaica’s GDP during the 
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review period might explain the small negative impact on the holdings of excess reserves 
in the long run. The paper identified the short-run determinants of excess reserves as 
lagged values of excess reserves, the BOJ 180-day rate, the required reserve ratio and the 
deficit of the Central Government, all of which were found to have a positive impact on 
excess reserves. In contrast, the volatility of currency to deposit ratio was found to have a 
negative impact on the demand for excess reserves.  
 
Given the findings it could be argued that banks will continue to hold relatively high 
excess reserves for a sustained period. However, a reduction in the fiscal deficit could 
substantially lower the commercial banks’ holdings of excess reserves and consequently 
the cost of open market operations. In addition, the promotion of policies that could help 
to channel excess liquidity into real sector activities would facilitate the reduction of 
these assets. In this regard, a useful line of investigation for future research would be to 
determine the role of credit in the monetary transmission mechanism in Jamaica.   
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6.0    Appendix 
Figure 11: Histogram Normality of Residuals  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: CUMSUM of Squares 
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